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Abstract
When investing in cyber security resources, information security managers have
to follow effective decision-making strategies. We refer to this as the cyber secu-
rity investment challenge. In this paper, we consider three possible decision sup-
port methodologies for security managers to tackle this challenge. We consider
methods based on game theory, combinatorial optimisation, and a hybrid of the
two. Our modelling starts by building a framework where we can investigate the
effectiveness of a cyber security control regarding the protection of different as-
sets seen as targets in presence of commodity threats. As game theory captures
the interaction between the endogenous organisation’s and attackers’ decisions,
we consider a 2-person control game between the security manager who has to
choose among different implementation levels of a cyber security control, and
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a commodity attacker who chooses among different targets to attack. The pure
game theoretical methodology consists of a large game including all controls
and all threats. In the hybrid methodology the game solutions of individual
control-games along with their direct costs (e.g. financial) are combined with a
knapsack algorithm to derive an optimal investment strategy. The combinato-
rial optimisation technique consists of a multi-objective multiple choice knapsack
based strategy. To compare these approaches we built a decision support tool
and a case study regarding current government guidelines. The endeavour of
this work is to highlight the weaknesses and strengths of different investment
methodologies for cyber security, the benefit of their interaction, and the impact
that indirect costs have on cyber security investment. Going a step further in
validating our work, we have shown that our decision support tool provides the
same advice with the one advocated by the UK government with regard to the
requirements for basic technical protection from cyber attacks in SMEs.
Keywords: Cyber security investments decision support, Game theory,
Optimisation.
1. Introduction
One of the biggest issues facing organisations today is how they are able to
defend themselves from potential cyber attacks. The range and scope of these
unknown attacks create the need for organisations to prioritise the manner in
which they defend themselves. With this each organisation needs to consider5
the threats that they are most at risk from and act in such a way so as to re-
duce the vulnerability across as many relevant vulnerabilities as possible. This
is a particularly difficult task that many Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) are not confident in achieving while in a report published by Deloitte
and NASCIO [1], 75.5% of CISOs cited lack of sufficient budget as a top chal-10
lenge. It is this perceived lack of sufficient funding that this work wishes to
address. As approximately 72% of cyber breaches occur at Small-Medium En-
terprises (SMEs) [2], we have decided to investigate cyber security investment
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decisions for SMEs. In addition to SMEs being attractive targets for cyber at-
tackers, from our work with local SMEs we have identified that they are heavily15
restricted with the available funding for cyber security, generally working with
a fixed budget with little to no additional funding being made available for cy-
ber security purposes. It is generally perceived that this budget is insufficient
for them to cover all of the vulnerabilities that their system may have. In this
way organisations have to make trade-offs with regard to how they defend their20
systems.
When an organisation is making decisions regarding the defence of their net-
work, they generally have to consider two critical factors; the cost of implement-
ing a particular defence and the impact that defence has on the business. The
first of these has been discussed, stating that a company can only implement25
defences that are within their limited budget, considered the Direct Cost of the
defence. However we question whether the apparently most optimal defence,
based solely on direct costs, is the correct choice for an organisation. The rea-
son behind this lies with the second criteria, such that the manner in which a
defence is implemented will likely have some effect on either the operation of30
the system or the users of the system. These effects may cause a reduction in
the speed that tasks can be performed by users or by a weakening of the defence
caused by users circumventing the controls in order to more easily perform their
required tasks. We consider that these factors create additional indirect costs
for implementing a given defence. These two factors are at the core of our work35
into the decision support of how to use the limited financial budget available to
best protect against cyber attacks.
The approach taken in this work is to model attackers using commodity cyber
threats against SMEs, where the attacker is using commonly available attack
vectors against known defendable vulnerabilities. While this doesn’t negate the40
possibility of zero-day vulnerabilities, it removes the expectation that it is in
the best interest of either player to invest heavily in order to either find a new
vulnerability or be able to protect against these unknown vulnerabilities. The
same approach has been taken by the UK government to provide cyber security
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advice to SMEs [3] and published in a report called “Cyber Essentials Scheme:45
Requirements for basic technical protection from cyber attacks”.
The seminal work of Anderson [4] considers the traps that defenders may
fall into in finding bugs and protecting their systems, where it only needs to be
a single unseen vulnerability that exposes the whole of a network. Important
to the modelling is the concept that the defenders have to attempt to defend50
everywhere. This is due to the fact that attackers can strike anywhere they
wish. We can highlight this observation by assuming that the defence provided
by optimal budget allocations can only be considered as strong as the defence
of the weakest target, as defined in [5]. This is because the weakest target is at
most risk from an attacker who can potentially attack anywhere. Our approach55
is quite different to Anderson’s as we focus on developing cyber security decision
support tools to assist security managers on how to spend a cyber security budget
in terms of different controls acquisition and implementation.
In a nutshell, this work proposes a two stage model designed to aid security
managers with decisions regarding the optimal allocation of a cyber security60
budget. We analyse the two stages of the model by first presenting an overview of
the environment from which we define the problem of cyber security investment,
identifying a unique manner for reasoning about the targets that a potential
attacker has, and the defences associated with those targets. This is done by
considering the physical location of a data asset, which needs to be protected, as65
well as the degree to which a particular defence, herein referred to as a control,
is implemented.
We use the above environment to formulate Control Games, which anal-
yse how well each given control performs at different degrees of implementation
(i.e. levels). We compute the Nash Equilibrium condition in Control Games, and70
we motivate the trade-offs required with the indirect costs. The Nash Equilib-
rium of a control-game dictates the most efficient manner, in which, a control
should be implemented. The solution to each control-game alone is insufficient in
dictating the optimal allocation of an organisation’s cyber security budget. So
to identify the best way to allocate a budget, we formalise the problem as75
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a multi-objective multiple choice Knapsack problem. We motivate the use of
this methodology by comparing the two-stage model to two alternative meth-
ods. Firstly, we model the scenario as an one shot game that aims to optimise
the defence including direct costs, and secondly a Knapsack problem that con-
siders only pure strategies for each control level including indirect costs. In both80
cases we highlight where our proposed method is able to outperform alternative
methods.
This paper significantly extends the results initially presented in [6]. Its
additional contributions include: enriching the mathematical notation to repre-
sent more coherent game information; providing a more in-depth mathematical85
analysis of Control Games’ equilibria; comparing the previously proposed, in
[6], method of investment, which was based on both Control games and multi-
objective Knapsack optimisation, to (i) a pure multi-objective Knapsack opti-
misation, and (ii) a Full Game approach, where we consider all possible controls,
levels, and targets under a single very large game; implementing a large scale90
case study using real world data from various reputable sources; and drawing
thorough insights regarding the effectiveness of our cyber security investment
method and highlighting how it is in line with [3].
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the
most important related work at the intersection of cyber security investments95
and selection of security controls. It also highlights how our approach is differ-
ent. In Section 3, we introduce the model components, which facilitate the risk
assessment prior to selection of security controls and investment. Section 4 uses
these components to build a game model and analyse a toy 2x2 game example
with a single control with two implementation levels and two targets. This aims100
to provide a feel for these games and what elements determine the equilibria. In
Section 5 we introduce the Control Subgames to support the analysis of large
than 2x2 games. In Section 6, we present three different cyber security invest-
ment approaches, which we have simulated by using a novel decision support
tools developed for the purposes of this paper. In Section 7 we develop a real105
world case study based on the SANS Critical Security Controls and CWE Top
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Software Vulnerabilities. This case study has been used to compare our findings
to the set of guidelines that the UK government has published in [3].
2. Related Work
Our work has been partially inspired by a recent contribution within the110
field of physical security [7], where the authors address the problem of finding
an optimal defensive coverage. The latter is defined as the one maximising the
worst-case payoff over the targets in the potential attack set. One of the main
ideas of this work we adopt here is that the more we defend the less rewards the
attacker receives.115
As the purpose of cyber security investments methodologies is to lead to the
selection of a set of cyber security controls that maximise the benefit of an or-
ganisation with respect to some available budget, we find papers that investigate
this optimal selection [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] as the most relevant to our work. In this
section, we summarise the most prominent works that investigate allocation of120
a cyber security budget after conducting cyber security risk assessment. Their
differences are briefly also summarised in Table 1.
One of the initial works studying the way to model investment in cyber se-
curity is published by Gordon and Loeb [13]. The authors consider the optimum
level of investment given different levels of information security level. The au-125
thors propose a model in which for any given vulnerability there are different
levels of information security that can be implemented, where a higher level of
information security will cause the expected loss to that particular vulnerability
to drop. This is modelled as a function of the security level’s responsiveness to an
increasing vulnerability in reducing loss. In our model, here, we consider a single130
value for a vulnerability, and then for each control there are a number of lev-
els of implementation, which represent the information security levels proposed
by Gordon and Loeb. The main message of this work is that to maximise the
expected benefit from information security investment, an organisation should
spend only a small fraction of the expected loss due to a security breach.135
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Inspired by [14], Lee et al. apply the profit-at-risk and operational risk mod-
elling approaches to propose a model that facilitates optimal customer informa-
tion security investments by providing undertaking trade-off analysis between
risk and return [15]. The authors define a minimum information security pro-
tection level that must be achieved in order investments in a customer privacy140
protection to be effective. Rakes et al. [10] extended previous mathematical mod-
els [16] to develop an integer programming model that optimises the selection of
a subset of security controls to mitigate certain threat level profiles. Authors as-
sessed their model under expected and worst-case threat levels towards deriving
tradeoffs for optimal security planning between these two threat levels. They145
also demonstrated budget-dependent risk curves giving emphasis in showing
how perturbed budget levels affect the aforesaid tradeoffs. In a similar vein,
Viduto et al. [11] formulate a multi-objective optimisation problem to select se-
curity controls in a cost-effective manner taking into account both financial cost
and security risk. Inspired by [10], Sawik [12] applies two popular in financial150
engineering (e.g. in portofolio management) measures of risk: value-at-risk and
conditional value-at-risk.
In [17], Nagurney et al. propose a supply chain network game theoretic model
in which retailers may be subject to a cyberattack and seek to maximise their
expected profits by selecting their optimal product transactions and cyberse-155
curity levels. A successful attack likelihood depends not only on the security
level of the retailer per se, but also on that of the other retailers. Authors also
show how cyber security investment cost functions vary according to consumers’
preferences for the product, which, in turn, depends on both the demand and
the security level. Srinidhi et al. [18] propose an optimisation model to reason160
about the allocation of cyber security resources to assets that have inherent
strength against cyber attack and security-enhancing assets (i.e. security con-
trols). They also investigate the role of cyber insurance in mitigating the effects
of breach costs as well as the incentives that both managers and investors in
spending upon cyber security products given that the first (i.e. managers) are165
more concerned with potential financial losses while the second (i.e. investors)
7
Table 1: Comparative analysis of major works that investigate allocation of a cyber security
budget after conducting cyber security risk assessment.
paper Game Th. Optimis. Real World Data Sec. Controls Sel.
[13, 15, 18] x X x x
[10, 11] x X X X
[12] x X x X
[17] X x x x
[19] X X x x
Our article X X X X
are reluctant to spend more in strengthening the firm’s security due to spreading
their risks by investing in different firms. Lastly, Cavusoglu et al. [19] compare
a decision-theoretic approach to game-theoretic approaches for investment in
cyber security. Authors neither use real world data to undertake their risk as-170
sessment nor do they investigate the optimal selection of security controls.
3. Model Definition
In this section we use game theory to model the interactions between two
players; the Defender (D) and the Attacker (A). The Defender might be the
cyber security manager in an SME, and her overall objective is to defend the175
organisation’s assets from cyber theft, mitigate any potential business disrup-
tion, and maintain the organisation’s reputation. On the other hand, A is a
cyber hacker who tries to subvert the system to her own end, by launching
commodity cyber attacks against the organisation D is working for. Commod-
ity cyber attacks are based on capabilities and techniques that are available on180
the internet, where the attack tool can be purchased therefore the adversaries
do not develop the attack themselves, and they can only configure the tool for
their own use.
In our model, D has an available cyber security budget B, and she wants to
invest in implementing cyber security controls to protect the organisation’s data185
assets against commodity attacks. Each control can be implemented at a different
level. Note that the higher the level the greater the degree to which the control
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is implemented. After its implementation, each control brings some security
benefits to the system, but it is also associated with indirect and direct costs. The
challenge D has to address is how to decide upon implementation of the different190
cyber security controls against commodity attacks, given a limited budget B, and
other preferences the organisation has in terms of risks and indirect costs. Our
work is based on quantitative risk assessment prior to deciding upon spending a
cyber security budget. Alpcan [20] (p. 134) discusses the importance of studying
the quantitative aspects of risk assessment with regard to cyber security in195
order to better inform decisions makers. In the following we discuss the different
components of the model, and we define appropriate terminology and notations,
which are consistent throughout this article.
We define the depth of a data asset as the location of this asset within the
organisation’s structure following the rule: the higher the depth is, the more200
confidential data the asset holds. In other words, a depth determines the impor-
tance of the data asset that the organisation loses if a commodity attack (herein
referred to as attack) is successful. In this paper, we specify that data assets
that are located at the same are depth worth the same value to D’s firm.
We denote the set of cyber security targets within an organisation by T :=205
{ti}, the set of vulnerabilities threatened by commodity attacks by V := {vz},
and the set of depths by D := {dx}. A cyber security target is defined as a
(vulnerability, depth) pair; formally ti := (vz, dx). This abstracts any data as-
set, located at dx, that an attack threatens to compromise by exploiting vz. We
specify that data assets located at the same depth and having the same vulner-210
abilities are abstracted by the same target. Each target is associated with an
impact value which expresses the level of damage incurred to D’s organisation
when A succeeds in their attack against that target. The different impact fac-
tors can be data loss, business disruption, and reputation damage. Each impact
factor depends on the depth dx that the attack targets. Furthermore, there is215
a threat value for each target. This can account, for instance, for the frequency
of attacks launched against that target. Each software weakness (we use the
terms weakness and vulnerability interchangeably) has some factors that can
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determine an overall score. Let I : T → Z+ be the random variable which takes
targets ti to the impact value that the compromise of ti will have to the organ-220
isation, and let T : T → Z+, be the random variable which takes target ti ∈ T
to its threat value. Aligned with the definition of target, I(ti) depends on the
depth dx, and T (ti) depends on the vulnerability vz.
A cyber security control is the defensive mechanism that D can put in place
to alleviate the risk from one or more attacks by reducing the probability of these225
attacks successfully exploiting vulnerabilities. D chooses to implement a control
at a certain level for their organisation. We define the set of implementation
levels of a control as L := {lλ}. The higher the level the greater the degree to
which the control is implemented4. An implementation level l has a degree of
vulnerability mitigation on each target. This is determined by the efficacy, in230
terms of cyber defence, of l on this target. For a pair (l, t), which represents the
level of implementation of a particular control, we define the random variable
E : L × T → [0, 1), which takes a pair of (l,t) to the efficacy value of l on
t. Here, we have postulated that E(l, t) 6= 1 due to the existence of 0-day
vulnerabilities that A has the potential to exploit. Assume D implements a235
control at l that has efficacy E(l, t) on t. We define the cyber security loss
random variable S(l, t) = I(t)T (t) [1 − E(l, t)]. This is the expected damage
(e.g. losing some data asset) that D suffers when t is attacked and a control
has implemented at level l. This definition of loss is in line with the well-known
formula, risk = expected damage (I(t)) × probability of occurrence (T (t)) [21].240
While the implementation of a cyber security control strengthens the defence
of D’s organisation, it is associated with two types of costs namely; indirect and
direct. Examples of indirect cost are System Performance Cost, Morale Cost,
and Re-Training Cost. For a level l we express its indirect cost by the random
variable C : L → Z+. From the above we can derive the overall loss of D’s245
organisation. This is equivalent to the sum of the security damages inflicted by
A and the indirect cost for implementing a control at a certain level. Formally,
4Note that we abuse notation by setting lλ = l, ti = t, vz = v, and dx = d.
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when D implements a control at some level i then the expected loss of their
organisation is derived by
∑
t S(l, t) − C(l). The implementation of a control,
at some level, has a direct cost, which refers to the budget the organisation250
must spend to this implementation. For instance, we can split such direct cost
into two categories, the Capital Cost and Labour Cost. We express the direct
cost of an implementation level l by the random variable Γ: L → Z+ that takes
implementation levels to the monetary cost of the control implementation.
4. Cyber Security Control Games255
In this article we formulate two-player non-cooperative static games, called
Control Games. The players in a Control Game are the Defender (D), which
represents any cyber security decision-maker, and A, which represents any cy-
ber hacker who uses commodity attacks. The former defends their organisa-
tion’s data assets by minimising expected cyber security losses with respect to260
some indirect costs, while A aims at benefiting from compromising these as-
sets. D is choosing how to implement a cyber security control (i.e. at which
level) and A decides which target to attack to exploit its vulnerability at a cer-
tain depth. Since we consider a simultaneous game, A does not know the control
implementation strategy and D does not know the attack strategy. We refer to265
our games as Control Games because the basis of our formulation is that D has
one control at her disposal.
First, we formulate zero-sum Control Games. These represent scenarios where
A aims at causing the maximum possible damage to D. We believe that if we
consider a non-zero sum game then a specific threat model must be defined270
as well. Such a model could consider, for instance, some cost for A when un-
dertaking an attack. However cost in terms of cyber attacks is tightly coupled
with the adversary’s profile. A consideration of a specific threat model would
also have some influence on the way A sees the different targets as she is af-
ter specific goals based on her motivation (i.e, cyber crime, hacktivism, cyber275
espionage). In this case, different A profiles could have been investigated. In
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our work here, we have not investigated such profiles and our work is limited
to a generic assumption that A is taking advantage of commodity attacks that
she can purchase from online sources. In other word, we have assumed a set of
attack methods that A can choose from but we have not postulated anything280
about their motivations.
For a given cyber security control, D can choose to implement the control at
level l ∈ L and therefore her pure strategy set coincides with L. A selects a vul-
nerability to exploit at a certain depth. Formally, A chooses t = 〈v, d〉 ∈ T . Thus
the pure strategy set of A coincides with T . Given that the pure strategy sets285
of the players are L and T then D has m pure strategies and A has n, corre-
spondingly. We denote by G := 〈A,E〉 an m× n bi-matrix cyber security game
where D (i.e. row player) has a payoff matrix A ∈ Rm×n and the payoff matrix
of A (i.e. the column player) is denoted by E ∈ Rm×n. D chooses as one of her
pure strategies one of the rows of the payoff bi-matrix 〈A,E〉 := [(alt, elt)]l,t. For290
any pair of strategies (l, t), D and A have payoff values equivalent to alt and
elt, given by alt := S(l, t)−C(l) and elt := −S(l, t) +C(l). Table 2 is the game
matrix presenting player’s payoffs for the different pure strategy profiles.
A player’s mixed strategy is a distribution over the set of their pure strate-
gies. The representation of D’s mixed strategy space is a finite probability distri-295
bution over the set of the different control implementation levels {l1, . . . , lm}. For
A, the representation of their mixed strategy space is a probability distribution
over the different targets {t1, . . . , tn}. In this paper we are interested in how
different control implementation levels are combined in a proportional manner
to give an implementation plan for this control. We call this a cyber security300
plan. This allows us to examine advanced ways of mitigating vulnerabilities.
We occasionally refer to the implementation of a control at a certain level
as a cyber security process. We can then define the cyber security plan as the
probability distribution over different cyber security processes. When investing
in cyber security we will be looking into the direct cost of each cyber security305
plan which is derived as a combination of the different costs of the cyber security
processes that comprise this plan.
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Table 2: Game matrix.
t t′
l S(l, t)− C(l),−S(l, t) + C(l) S(l, t′)− C(l),−S(l, t′) + C(l)
l′ S(l′, t)− C(l′),−S(l′, t) + C(l′) S(l′, t′)− C(l′),−S(l′, t′) + C(l′)
We defineD’s mixed strategy as the probability distribution Φ = [φ1, . . . , φm].
This expresses a cyber security plan, where φλ is the probability of implement-
ing the control at lλ. A cyber security plan can be realised as advice to D on310
how to implement a cyber security control by combining different implementa-
tion levels. Although this assumption complicates our analysis at the same time
it allows us to reason about equilibria of the control game therefore providing a
more effective strategy for D. We claim that our model is flexible thus allowing
D to interpret mixed strategies in different ways to satisfy their requirements. A315
mixed strategy of A is a probability distribution over the different targets and
it is denoted by Θ = [θ1, . . . , θn], where θi is the probability of the adversary at-
tacking ti. When both players choose a pure strategy randomly according to the
probability distributions determined by Φ and Θ, the expected payoffs to D and
A are JD(Φ,Θ) :=
∑n
i=1
∑m
λ=1 φλ aiλ θi, and JA(Φ,Θ) :=
∑n
i=1
∑m
λ=1 φλ eiλ θi.320
For the remainder of this section, we analyse a specific Control Game. We
assume that for a specific target t, D has only two possible levels at her disposal
namely l, and l′ (e.g. performing penetration testing rarely during a year or
often), to implement a control. We define ∆S(t) := S(l′, t)− S(l, t) and ∆C :=
C(l′)−C(l). ∆S(t) is the reduction in damage when l′ is chosen, and ∆C is the325
extra indirect cost of l′ over l.
Lemma 1. When the reduction in damage achieved by l′ over l is higher than
the extra indirect cost that l′ introduces, D chooses l′.
Proof. If the reduction in damage achieved by l′ over l is higher than the
extra indirect cost that l′ then ∆S(t) > ∆C. This can be broken down as,330
S(l′, t) − S(l, t) > C(l′) − C(l) ⇔ S(l′, t) − C(l′) > S(l, t) − C(l) ⇔ al′t >
alt. Therefore, the D is incentivised to pick l′ as it has a higher utility. 
Lemma 2. If S(l, t) > S(l, t′) then Attacker attacks target t.
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Proof. For a specific control implementation l and two targets t, t′, A’s best
response can be found by comparing elt, elt′ . If elt > elt′ ⇔ S(l, t) − C(l) >335
S(l, t′) − C(l) ⇔ S(l, t) > S(l, t′), A prefers to attack target t. Specifically we
define this property as ∆S(l) := S(l, t′)−S(l, t). Therefore, if S(l, t) > S(l, t′)⇔
S(l, t′)− S(l, t) < 0⇔ ∆S(l) < 0, A chooses t. 
Since we are investigating a two-person zero-sum game with finite number of
actions for both players, and according to Nash [22] it admits at least a Nash340
Equilibrium (NE) in mixed strategies. Saddle-points correspond to Nash equilib-
ria as discussed in [20]. The following result, from [23], establishes the existence
of a saddle (equilibrium) solution in the games we examine and summarises
their properties.
The investigated cyber security game admits a saddle point in mixed strate-345
gies, (Φ∗,Θ∗), with the properties Φ∗ = arg maxΦ minΘ JU (Φ,Θ), and Θ∗ =
arg maxΘ minΦ JA(Φ,Θ).
Corollary 3. Regardless of the Attacker’s strategy, the Nash Defender guaran-
tees a minimum performance, that is an upper limit of expected damage.
Proof. The minimax theorem states that for zero sum games NE, maxmin350
and minimax solutions coincide. Therefore Φ∗ = arg minΦ maxΘ JA(Φ,Θ). 
Since in this work we consider zero sum games, two criticisms are possible:
Remark 1. The gain of the Attacker is not, in general, equal to the loss of the
defender.
Remark 2. The Attacker’s payoff is not related to the defender indirect costs.355
We address both Remarks by noticing that a significant class of realistic cyber
security games can be mathematically reduced to zero sums games. Remark 1
is addressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium (Φ∗,Θ∗) in our zero sum cyber security game G
remains the same in the negative affine transformation of this game in which360
the Attacker’s gain does not equal the Defender’s loss.
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Proof. We claim that a model of the A where his payoffs are a negative affine
transformation of the D loss is a reasonable model. For example by selling stolen
data on the black market for only one tenth of the data’s value.
A negative affine transformation of the Defender’s A matrix is defined as365
ωA + ψ, where ω is a negative scalar, and ψ is a constant matrix of the same
dimension as A. Therefore, in addition to the cyber security game G = (A,−A),
we intuitively define the negative affinity of this game as G− = (A, ωA+ ψ).
Suppose Φ∗,Θ∗ are the equilibrium strategies in G. First, it is easy to see
that Φ∗ is the Defender’s equilibrium strategy in both G and G− due to the370
Defender’s game matrix remaining the same. Formally, ΦAΘ∗ ≤ Φ∗AΘ∗. Sim-
ilarly, we prove that Θ∗ is Attacker’s equilibrium strategy in both games. We
have that Φ∗ (−A) Θ ≤ Φ∗ (−A) Θ∗ ⇒ Φ∗AΘ ≥ Φ∗AΘ∗ ⇒ Φ∗ (ωA+ ψ)Θ ≤
Φ∗ (ωA+ ψ)Θ∗. This means that equilibria are the same in both G,G−. 
Lemma 5. A game Ĝ where the Defender’s indirect cost C is a positive affine375
transformation of the direct cost S, has the same maxmin solution with G.
Proof. According to the Lemma we have that in Ĝ D’s payoff is given by
S − (κS − µ) = S (1 − κ) − µ, where κ, µ are positive scalars. Assume that
at the equilibrium of Ĝ D’s best response is Φ∗. Then we have Φ
[
S (1 − κ) −
µ
]
Θ∗ ≤ Φ∗
[
S (1− κ)− µ
]
Θ∗ ⇒ Φ (S − κS − µ) Θ∗ ≤ Φ∗ (S − κS − µ) Θ∗ ⇒380
Φ (S − µ) Θ∗ ≤ Φ∗ (S − µ) Θ∗ µ=C=⇒ Φ (S − C) Θ∗ ≤ Φ∗ (S − C) Θ∗ ⇒ ΦAΘ∗ ≤
Φ∗AΘ∗. Therefore G, Ĝ have the same equilibria, and from Corollary 3 these
are also maxmin solutions. 
To illustrate the game approach let’s consider a toy example consisting of
a 2-level, and 2-target control games, where D and A make their decisions385
simultaneously, or, equivalently, independently of each other. The information
sets associated with the the control game, investigated in this section, depicted
in Fig. 1; a dashed curve encircling the A nodes has been drawn. This indicates
that A cannot distinguish between these two points. In other words, A has to
arrive at a decision without knowing what D has actually chosen.390
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Figure 1: Game tree for the control game with 2 implementation levels and two targets.
Due to the game being zero-sum, we have kept only the payoffs of D at
the game tree. We also defined the mixed strategy of D as the probability
distribution [φ, 1−φ], where φ is the probability of implementing the control at
level l. A’s mixed strategy is denoted by [θ, 1− θ], where A chooses to attack t
with probability θ. Table 3 summarizes all possible best responses of the control395
game for the different conditions discussed in this section.
In a two target, two level control sub-game, it is possible to define the prob-
abilities that each player plays a particular mixed strategy.
Lemma 6. The Nash equilibrium for a control sub-game for the D’s, given by
φ∗ ∈ [0, 1] is φ∗ = ∆S(l′)∆S(l′)−∆S(l) .400
Proof. The D wants to make the A indifferent to which target they should
attack. This is given by equalising the expected payoff of the A, thus A(t) =
φ∗ elt + (1− φ∗) el′t and A(t′) = φ∗ elt′ + (1− φ∗) el′t′ , giving
Table 3: Nash equilibria for the different conditions.
∆S(t′) > ∆C ∆S(t′) < ∆C
∆S(t) > ∆C
∆S(l′) > 0 (l′, t) ∆S(l′) < 0 (φl′, (1− θ)t)
∆S(l′) < 0 (l′, t′) ∆S(l) > 0 ((1− φ)l, θt′)
∆S(t) < ∆C
∆S(l) < 0 ((1− φ)l′, (1− θ)t′) ∆S(l) > 0 (l, t)
∆S(l′) > 0 (φl, θt) ∆S(l) < 0 (l, t′)
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φ∗ elt + (1− φ∗) el′t = φ∗ elt′ + (1− φ∗) el′t′ . (1)
We can substitute terms such that Eq. (1) can be written in terms of elt, hence
el′t = elt − ∆S(t) + ∆C, elt′ = elt − ∆S(l), and el′t′ = elt − ∆S(t) + ∆C −405
∆S(l′). By substituting the above equations into Eq. (1) we get φ∗ elt + (1 −
φ∗) (elt−∆S(t)+∆C) = φ∗ (elt−∆S(l))+(1−φ∗)(elt−∆S(t)+∆C−∆S(l′))⇒
∆S(l′) = φ∗(∆S(l′)−∆S(l))⇒ φ∗ = ∆S(l′)∆S(l′)−∆S(l) . 
Lemma 7. The Nash strategy of the A in a control sub-game, is given by θ∗ =
∆S(t)−∆C+∆S(l′)−∆S(l)
∆S(l′)−∆S(l) .410
Proof. At the equilibrium, the A wants to make the D indifferent to which
target they should attack. By equalising the expected payoff of the Dwe have
that D(l) = θ∗ alt + (1 − θ∗) alt′ must equal D(l′) = θ∗ al′t + (1 − θ∗) al′t′ .
Therefore θ∗ alt + (1− θ∗) alt′ = θ∗ al′t + (1− θ∗) al′t′ . We can substitute terms
such that the above equation can be written in terms of alt, al′t = alt+∆S(t)−415
∆C, alt′ = alt+∆S(l), and al′t′ = alt+∆S(t)−∆C+∆S(l′), and by substituting
these equations into the former we get θ∗ alt + (1− θ∗) (alt + ∆S(l)) = θ∗(alt +
∆S(t)−∆C)+(1−θ∗) (alt+∆S(t)−∆C+∆S(l′))⇒ alt+∆S(l)−θ∗∆S(l) =
alt + ∆S(t)−∆C + ∆S(l′)− θ∗∆S(l′)⇒ θ∗ = ∆S(t)−∆C+∆S(l
′)−∆S(l)
∆S(l′)−∆S(l) . 
5. Cyber Security Control Subgames420
When looking into investing in cyber security one might face the challenge of
not having a necessary financial budget to implement the equilibria of a cyber
security Control Game. To tackle this challenge we define cyber security Con-
trol Subgames, which constitute a Control Game by gradually increasing the
available implementation levels of the control. In this way, we can derive a num-425
ber of equilibria that can satisfy a wider range of financial capacity. A Control
Subgame Gjλ is a game where (i) D’s pure strategies correspond to consecutive
implementation levels of the control j starting always from 0 (i.e. fictitious
control-game) and including all levels up to λ and, (ii) A’s pure strategies are
the different targets akin to pairs of vulnerabilities and depths.430
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We represent D’s mixed strategy, in Gjλ, as the probability distribution
Qjλ = [qj0, . . . , qjλ]. This expresses a cybersecurity plan, where qjl is the prob-
ability of implementing cj at level l in Gjλ. A mixed strategy of A is defined
as a probability distribution over the different targets, in Gjλ, and it is denoted
by Hjλ = [hj1, . . . , hjn], where hji is the probability of the adversary attacking435
ti when D has only cj in their possession. D’s aim in a Control Subgame is
to choose the Nash cybersecurity plan Q?jλ = [q
?
j0, . . . , q
?
jλ]. This consists of λ
cybersecurity processes chosen probabilistically as determined by the NE of Gjλ.
To illustrate this we take for example a security control entitled Vulnerability
Scanning and Automated Patching, and we assume 5 different implementation440
levels i.e. {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} where level 4 corresponds to real-time scanning while level
2 to regular scanning. We say that a mixed strategy [0, 0, 0.7, 0, 0.3] determines a
cyber security plan that dictates the following: 0.3 7→ real-time scanning for the
30% of the most important devices; 0.7 7→ regular scanning for the remaining
70% of devices. This mixed strategy can be realised more as an advice to a445
security manager on how to undertake different control implementations rather
than a rigorous set of instructions related only to a time factor. We claim that
our model is flexible thus allowing the defender to interpret mixed strategies in
different ways to satisfy their requirements.
6. Cyber Security Investment450
The analysis performed in Section 4 has considered a single-control, two-
targets, two-levels game. When having c cyber security controls, our plan for
cyber investment is to solve c Control Games by splitting each of them up to a
set of m−1 Control Subgames with n targets and up to λ implementation levels
for each control, where λ ∈ {1,m}. For a Control Game the Control Subgame455
equilibria constitute the Control Game solution.
Given the Control Subgame equilibria we then use a Knapsack algorithm to
provide the general investment solution. The equilibria provide us with informa-
tion regarding the way in which each security control is best implemented, so as
18
to maximise the benefit of the control with regard to both the A’s strategy, and460
the indirect costs of the organisation.
It is easy to see that, Control Subgames (and consequently Control Games)
look only at vulnerabilities that are directly relevant to the control being imple-
mented. The cyber security investment problem expands to represent all of an
organisation’s vulnerabilities and select the best cyber security controls based465
on the outcomes of the Control Games. With regard to an implementation of
cyber security processes based on the Control Subgame solutions, it is impor-
tant to understand what a Control Game solution represents in the process of
making those decisions. In particular this is about what a mixed strategy means
in terms of control implementation.470
We motivate the concept of a mixed strategy as a method for trying to define
where in the system it is most effective to implement the control. Based on our
interpretation of the structure of a network, this will generally involve protecting
devices at the highest depth with the strictest controls where possible, then
assigning lower levels of controls to devices and users that operate at depths475
with less sensitive data. This is performed by creating a logical ordering of the
most important devices, based on the perceived risk of the device or the user, as
part of a risk assessment methodology. While there may be a logical ordering
across an organisation for all controls, it often might make more sense to order
users and devices specifically for each control based on vulnerability.480
6.1. Full Game Representation
A Full Game representation considers the method of solving the investment
problem by creating a strategic game containing the set of feasible choices avail-
able to both players. D’s pure strategies are comprised of an implementation
level for each of the controls, and A’s pure strategies consist of each target in485
the set of all possible targets. One of the considerations that needs to be made
is with regards to the budget. A pure game-theoretic solution for the cyber
investment problem would require modelling n targets, m control levels and c
controls. A naive choice would be to consider c ×m × n games. However it is
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not clear how to force these game solutions to satisfy budget constraints.490
A game model satisfying budget constraints could be built using the idea
of “schedules” [24], i.e. a pure strategy is a tuple of c ×m bits where each bit
represents the implementation of a control at a particular level, and 1 stands
for “implemented” and 0 for “not implemented”. The budget requirement can
be easily imposed on such tuples, for example by only considering tuples whose495
costs do not exceed the budget. The problem with this is that, in principle, there
could be an exponential number of pure strategies, in the order of 2(c×m). Also
it would be non-trivial to choose appropriate payoffs for such tuples. In this
case, we restrict the combination of controls in the payoff matrix to only those
that can be purchased based on the maximum amount of budget.500
6.2. Hybrid Method
The Hybrid method avoids the problems of the Full Game method by con-
sidering the particular game solutions of each Control Game (and consequently
the game solutions of all Control Subgames that comprise this Control Game)
as part of an overall combinatorial optimisation problem which we will solve505
using 0-1 Multiple Choice, Multi-Objective Knapsack. The choice of this type
of Knapsack is motivated as follows: “0-1” because each level of implementation
of a control is implemented or not implemented; “Multiple Choice” because
only one solution for each control (the optimal one) ought to be chosen; and
“Multi-Objective” because each target represents an optimisation objective.510
For convenience, we denote the Control Subgame solution by the maximum
level of implementation available. For instance, for cj and the solution of Control
Subgame Gjλ is denoted by Q∗jλ. Let us assume that for control j the equilibria
of all Control Subgames are given by the set {Q∗j0, . . . , Q∗jm}. For each control
there exists a unique Control Subgame solution Qj0, which dictates that control515
j should not be used.
We define an optimal solution to the Knapsack problem as Ψ = {Q∗jλ}, ∀ j ∈
{1, . . . , c}, ∀λ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. A solution Ψ takes exactly one solution (i.e. equilib-
rium or cyber security plan) for each control as a policy for implementation. To
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represent the cyber security investment problem, we need to expand the def-520
initions for both expected damage S and effectiveness E to incorporate the
Control Subgame solutions. Hence, we expand S such that S(Qjλ, t), which is
the expected damage on target t given the implementation of Qjλ. Likewise, we
expand the definition of the effectiveness of the implemented solution on a given
target as E(Qjλ, t). Additionally, we consider Γ(Qjλ) as the direct cost of im-525
plementing Qjλ. If we represent the solution Ψ by the bitvector ~z, we can then
represent the 0-1 Multiple Choice, Multi-Objective Knapsack Problem as:
max
~z
min
ti
{{
1−
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
E(Qjλ, ti) zjλ
}
I(ti)T (ti)
}
s.t.
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
Γ(Qjλ) zjλ ≤ B
m∑
λ=0
zjλ = 1, zjλ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j = 1, . . . , c .
where B is the available cyber security budget, and zjλ = 1 when Q
∗
jλ ∈ Ψ. In
addition, we consider a tie-break condition in which if multiple solutions are
viable, in terms of maximising the minimum, according to the above function530
we will select the solution with the lowest cost. This ensures that an organisation
is not advised to spend more on security than would produce the same net effect.
6.3. Pure Knapsack Representation
A Pure Knapsack representation considers the method of solving the in-
vestment problem given that D only considers the implementation of “whole”535
controls. This is to say that the solutions supplied to the Knapsack solver are
representative of pure strategies solutions to the Control Subgames. To do this
in a fair manner, we need to include the indirect costs of each cyber security
plan (i.e. Control Subgame solution) into the calculation of benefit from each
target. This is because the Hybrid representation has taken into account the im-540
pact of the indirect costs in the Control Subgames. We first extend the definition
of indirect cost to incorporate Control Subgame solutions. Thus, we expand C
such that C(Qjλ), which is the indirect cost of Qjλ. Thereafter, we can extend
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the representation of the Knapsack problem to include the indirect costs as
follows:545
max−→z
min
ti
{{
1−
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
E(Qjλ, ti) zjλ
}
I(ti)T (ti)−
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
C(Qjλ)zjλ
}
s.t.
c∑
j=1
m∑
λ=0
Γ(Qjλ) zjλ ≤ B
m∑
λ=0
zjλ = 1, zjλ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j = 1, . . . , c .
6.4. Comparison of Methods
To compare the Full Game, Hybrid and Pure Knapsack methods of decision
support, we have developed a small case study that represents a small defence
decision making problem that might be seen by system administrators. The
problem creates an example with 7 controls and 13 vulnerabilities, created using550
a mapping from the SANS Critical Security Controls [25] combined with the
CWE Top 25 Software Vulnerabilities [26]. The case study presented in this
work considers a network separated into three different depths (i.e. Demilitarized
Zone, Intranet, and Private Subnet). For this example, we consider the levels
available to D to consist of the quick win processes provided by SANS.555
In comparing the damage at the weakest target provided by the Full Game
and Hybrid method to the Knapsack representation, we can see in Fig. 2 that, in
general, the Full Game representation will provide a better defence to the weak-
est target for low budget levels. This is due to the Full Game representation
being able to combine all controls in a more flexible manner than either the560
Hybrid or Pure Knapsack, because the Full Game representation has no draw-
backs to the implementation of the best controls in the most optimal configu-
ration, which is still a restriction on the two methods that implement the 0-1
restriction of the Knapsack. Additionally, the Hybrid is occasionally able to offer
a better solution than the Pure Knapsack, because the mixed strategies allow565
for certain control combinations to be used at a lower budget.
Each of the methods eventually reach a similar stable value, where although
there is still damage expected from attacks against the system, the additional
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cost to the performance of the system and users do not outweigh the benefit
of implementing the additional control. This is owing to the impact that the570
indirect cost has on the decision-making process, where the cost is added to the
damage to create the utility.
In the case where there are no indirect costs to implementing each control
there is no trade-off to achieve a higher defence. This means that providing
that an appropriate budget is available, the best defence will be purchased by575
all methods. In this case the solutions to the Control Subgames, in the Hybrid
method, become the same as the pure strategies used in the Pure Knapsack and
the resulting optimal solutions are the same.
We have found in terms of complexity of solutions provided, that the Pure
Knapsack has solutions that can be followed intuitively as they only ever con-580
sider a single level of implementation. We can also see that the Hybrid method
often uses pure strategies as in many cases the outcomes of the Control Sub-
games lead to a single strategy at many levels. However, we find that there is
an additional level of complexity in the comprehension of the strategies that are
produced by the Full Game. Such complexity can potentially lead to strategies585
that can not easily be followed by a user to gain the most from the solution. In
these cases, there is a risk that the solutions are not followed correctly and
with security. This could lead to a potentially weaker defence over a seemingly
weaker, but more easily interpreted solution.
In addition to the comparison above, we tested the example case presented590
by Rakes et. al. [10] to ensure that the optimisation algorithms used for solving
the Hybrid and Knapsack problem were acting correctly. The study could be
rebuilt using a reduced set of values from our model, which included the removal
of indirect costs and the assumption of only one level of implementation for
each control. In this example, we are able to obtain the same optimal set of595
countermeasures as the authors present in their work with a higher than 95%
success rate on tested cases.
While we have seen that the Full Game representation of the problem is
the most optimal on a small scale, the practicalities of operating such a system
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Figure 2: Comparison of Full Game, Hybrid and Pure Knapsack Methods of Decision Support.
on a larger scale is not possible. The next section details a more realistic case600
study consisting of 27 different controls acting on 36 different attacks, which
is not feasibly solved by a Full Game representation. The challenge behind the
Full Game representation of such a large case study, is that with multiple levels
the number of pure strategies is of the magnitude 1015; however, this is not a
challenge that is faced by the Hybrid representation, which does not need to605
represent each pure strategy to calculate a solution, only up to the maximum
number of levels in a Control Subgame.
7. Case Study
We have further used the ideas presented to develop a decision support tool
that is capable of working on more realistic scenarios. The role of this tool is610
to be able to offer realistic actionable advice to organisations. The following
represents a case study based on the design of a typical SME network, with the
data used in the representation of the attacks, controls and costs for this case
study available online [27].
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Table 4: Case Study Vulnerability Type Distribution.
Vulnerability Type No. Vulnerability Type No.
Software Errors: Data Interaction 8 Software Errors: Resource Management 8
Software Errors: Defence Flaws 6 Social Engineering: Targeted 3
Social Engineering: Untargeted 4 Network Vulnerabilities: Direct 3
Network Vulnerabilities: Indirect 4 - -
7.1. Case Study Composition615
The attacks have been built from a subset of the CVE [28] and CWE, which
a conventional networked system would be expected to face, as well as a number
of social engineering based attacks. The distribution of attacks amongst certain
kinds can be seen in Table 4. The factors that are associated with the CWSS
have been used to formulate the basis of the values for the vulnerabilities. There620
are two differences between the CWSS scoring system and the one used for this
study. The first is the isolation of threat factors, since we are interested in the
ability of an organisation to be able to identify their own concerns regarding
the impact of a successful attack.
While a number of factors have been removed, a number of additional fac-625
tors have been included to better differentiate different attacks. This has also
provided a more generic insight into the decision making process of the at-
tacker. Critically this involves the identification, availability and ease of the
attacks for them to perform. This is done to indicate a partial reduction in risk
of certain attacks, while making those that are easier to perform more enticing630
for the attacker. These are designed in such a way as to work not only with the
attacker decision making in the Control Subgames, but also affect the designa-
tion of the potential weakest target in the optimisation. This aids in shifting
some risk to the requirement of attacker capability.
The controls used in this case study are a set of actionable controls that635
a system administrator can implement to improve the security of their net-
work. The controls have been derived from the SANS Top 20 critical security
controls, separating the overarching control advice, to better reflect a single
point of investment. The controls cover a variety of types of defensive strat-
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Table 5: Case Study Control Type Distribution.
Control Type No. Control Type No.
Security Software 4 Network Security Tools 7
System Configuration 8 Administration Tools 2
Policy Development 4 Education and Training 2
egy, the distribution of which can be seen in Table 5.640
The CVSS and CWSS both contain details regarding the efficiency of con-
trols for protecting against a particular vulnerability. This internal definition
of control effectiveness against each attack does not support our model for op-
timal defence spending. As such the effectiveness was redesigned to identify
which controls can mitigate which vulnerabilities, spread the efficiency amongst645
the viable levels, and interpret the viability of the control over the life of the
solution, based either on complexity or frequency.
Each organisation is likely to have different configurations of systems and
sizes and this makes defining the costs, in terms of a direct financial value,
difficult. An over specialised budget requirement would make using the tool650
infeasible in the real world. To remedy this we have normalised the direct costs
of the control, such that the implementation of a number of controls operating
at a conventional level from the advice has a cost of 1; an example of this is
weekly patching.
The indirect costs are considered to be the importance that the organisation655
places on the day-to-day performance of the system, as well as the ability and
willingness of staff to comply with any additional security policies. To do this, we
define the indirect cost as an expected level of additional disruption caused in
one of three categories: System Performance, any reduction in the speed and
capability of the system to perform the related business tasks; User Morale, the660
impact of the control on the behaviour of the system users; and Re-Training, the
additional requirements for users of the system to be able to use the new control.
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7.2. Experimental Comparison
The UK has published a set of guidelines that organisations, similar to the
one in the case study, should comply with in order to reduce the risk of damage665
from cyber attacks [3]. The document called Cyber Essentials suggests a number
of basic controls that organisations should implement to protect themselves
from cyber attacks. The controls considered by Cyber Essentials are the use
of firewalls and gateways, user access control, secure configuration, malware
protection and patch management.670
To perform this comparison, we have set a number of budget points in our
control data, which represent different levels of investment. The first test case
presents the scenario which accounts for the lowest price that allows for the
implementation of Cyber Essentials at the lowest level. The second budget value
allows for each of the controls from Cyber Essentials to be implemented at the675
highest level, while the final budget considers the availability of a higher level
of investment beyond the advice offered by Cyber Essentials.
We are interested in investigating if controls in positions, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 20 and
23 are recommended, as they relate to those suggested by Cyber Essentials. Both
controls 5 and 7 relate to the implementation of firewalls, where control 5 is for680
network firewalls and control 7 relates to web application firewalls. Likewise
controls 20 and 23 relate to User Access Controls, with User Access Controls
representing the access policies concerning the network and devices in control
20 and Account Management Control tools for users implemented in control 23.
7.3. Results685
The following section describes the results obtained from calculating the op-
timal defence strategy for the case study outlined. The results shown here are
obtained using an implementation of the hybrid model solved using a genetic
algorithm. The lowest budget shown in Table 6 chooses to implement four out
of the five controls outlined in Cyber Essentials, with two of the controls being690
preferred at a higher level than the implementation of an additional control. The
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optimal solution suggests implementing Patch Management and Network Fire-
walls at level two, with Anti-Malware and Secure Configurations both suggested
at the most basic level. Under this limited budget, it is not suggested to have
either Web Application Firewalls or User Access Controls, over the higher levels695
of other controls. In addition to the Cyber Essentials controls, the optimal solu-
tion suggests the implementation of an Incident Response Policy, which covers
predominantly social engineering targets, with some minimal effect, but has a
small cost.
When the budget is increased to 8, we see that the initial four controls in700
Cyber Essentials represented in the previous optimal solution are still repre-
sented, but with three controls recommended at a higher level. The optimal
solution is to perform Patch Management at the highest level, such that it
should be performed on demand. In this context it means that patches should
be checked on a daily basis and implemented as soon as possible.705
This budget brings in Account Management Control as a recommenda-
tion, which represents the last of the controls recommended by Cyber Essen-
tials. The implementation recommends a strict account management control
system, limiting the potential use of accounts, which reduces the risk of attacks
being able to escalate privileges or access sensitive files with hijacked low level710
accounts. Additionally, we see the introduction of Web Application Firewalls
in addition to the Network Firewalls that were suggested before, with a strict
level of implementation. Since more of the vulnerabilities are covered to a higher
level, the impact of the relatively cheap Incident Report Handling control has
been removed as its addition has too minimal an impact to justify the cost. The715
controls outside of Cyber Essentials that are now considered are Automated
Inventory Scanning and Management and basic Intrusion Detection Systems.
For a budget of 16, given by the solution 16a in Table 6, the solution differs
from the previous budgets only in a few aspects. In terms of Cyber Essentials
the optimal solution recommends implementing Network Firewalls at a lower720
level, however the solution still maintains the strict implementation of Web
Application Firewalls. The other controls proposed by Cyber Essentials that
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Table 6: Case Study Results.
Budget Solution
3 [0, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]
8 [1, 5, 0, 4, 2, 0, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0]
16a [4, 5, 0, 4, 1, 3, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 1, 0, 0, 0]
16b [2, 5, 0, 3, 2, 2, 3, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 4, 0, 2, 0, 3, 1, 0, 0, 1]
had been recommended remain implemented at the same level as with a budget
of 8. Inventory Management tools, are now implemented at a higher level than
previously seen, moving from yearly inventory logging to weekly. The optimal725
solution now recommends the use of Intrusion Prevention Systems instead of
Intrusion Detection Systems, which operate to cover more vulnerabilities than
Network Firewalls, but were more costly to implement, making them less viable
at lower budgets. Another additional control suggested at this budget level is
the inclusion of yearly User Education and Training, which is used to improve730
a number of social engineering based attacks.
7.4. Discussion
The results from the experimentation show with some consistency that the
controls associated with Cyber Essentials are appropriate defensive measures
for this kind of network. At low budgets, the system recommends implementing735
a number of controls that are suggested by Cyber Essentials, but not all of
them, preferring to offer a more stable configuration of these controls over adding
additional controls. At a higher budget, we see that the remaining controls are
considered, with them being used beyond a basic level of implementation.
In all the cases presented the implementation of a rigorous Patching pol-740
icy is recommended where possible, as well as the presence of some Anti-
malware, Firewalls and Secure Configuration. The main thing that can be ob-
served from the data is that a combination of all of these four controls covers
each of the vulnerabilities in the case study to some degree. This means that
by increasing the level of any of these controls, there is guaranteed to be some745
observable reduction in damage on the system.
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To follow this, one of the observations made throughout the experimentations
the impact that the indirect costs have on the decision to implement certain
security controls. The crucial component, is that as has been noted, a set of four
controls are able to cover all the vulnerabilities to some level of efficiency; this750
means that the implementation of an additional control will only serve to reduce
the impact of a vulnerability by a fraction of its maximum efficiency, while the
costs for that control remain the same. As such there is a diminishing return
on each control that you add to the system, which means that after certain
values, it makes it more costly to the organisation to implement the control755
against the additional risk that they might mitigate.
Having seen how important the indirect costs are to calculating the optimal-
ity of the advice given, we have looked at the impact of a reduction in indirect
costs. For this we have taken the highest budget level, which in the previous
example was not using the whole of the budget due to indirect costs and have760
reduced the impact of indirect costs to 0.1 of their previous values.
The suggested implementation of controls, given by the solution 16b in table
6, changes the optimal strategy to introduce a series of new controls in addition
to those seen previously. Even with a lower importance on indirect costs, we
see that the optimal solution still recommends the implementation of the Cyber765
Essentials controls suggested in the initial tests.
Additional government advice suggest the use of Whitelisting, which is not
seen in the initial solutions. While whitelisting of both applications (control 19)
and websites (control 21) are able to prevent a number of cyber attacks by pre-
venting access, they have a high negative impact on the daily operations of the770
organisation. This results in a high indirect cost, which reflects their exclusion
in the previous optimal solutions. However, with relaxed indirect costs, the neg-
ative impact now no longer outweighed by the benefit, which now represents
their inclusion in the optimal solution. The same advice recommends penetra-
tion testing if possible if you are expecting to be at risk of more long term775
attacks, this control is also recommended in the solution with revised indirect
costs.
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8. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented an analysis of a hybrid game-theoretic and
optimisation approach to the allocation of an SME’s cyber security budget. For780
this purpose, we have compared three different approaches to allocating this
budget by using a decision support tool. In terms of understanding the solu-
tions, we have found that with a relatively small case study the results can be
interpreted in a relatively simple manner. However, we are concerned that for a
larger case study the Full Game representation would create solutions that are785
too complex to be interpreted in an accurate manner so that they could result
in a weaker defence. This work also highlights the impact, which the indirect
costs have on the problem of cyber security budget allocation. Considering the
downside that the implementation of a control may have on the organisation is
important, since it can better capture the decision-making process required for790
investment. The results presented in this paper demonstrate how those indirect
costs are able to influence the optimal decision in cyber security budget alloca-
tion. We aim to use the work presented in this paper to inform models of attacks
against a system. These games model the interactions between an attacker and
defender at the point of attack, and during an ongoing attack. To do this we will795
consider multi-stage games which represent the stages of an attack and recov-
ery in a system. In addition, we aim to investigate cyber security investments
by following a multidisciplinary approach that combines economic, behavioural,
societal and engineering insights. Our end goal is to achieve increased societal
resilience to cyber security risks through more efficient and effective institutional800
and incentives structures. Last but not least, in future work we aim to investi-
gate how cyber insurance [2] can influence cyber security investment decisions.
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